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SUMMARY 
In this paper a model-to-model analysis is described which compares a model of ethnic 
mobilisation with a model of hierarchy decline. Even though the two models are not 
concerned with the same or at least a similar target, they are related by empirical findings: 
e.g. the decline of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was predominantly driven by 
processes of ethnic mobilisation. This appears to be a more general pattern, not restricted to 
this specific example. Hence, both models can be regarded as describing two related aspects 
of one and the same social process. However, since neither models describe a concrete target 
system, but rely on the notion of stylised facts, the models cannot be directly compared with 
reference to an empirical relative. Instead, in this paper a theoretical framework is elaborated 
which works as a rule for a comparison: relying on a differentiation between mass 
phenomena and decisions centres, the process of ethnic mobilisation can be identified as a 
mass-phenomenon, while the process of hierarchy decline concerns social decision centres. 
While mass-phenomena gain their effectiveness by enforcing social institutions, the working 
condition for decision centres is the establishment of social positions. It will be argued that 
the relation between these two phenomena can be described by the analogy of a lock and key. 
This makes possible conclusions with regard to both social theory and empirical explanations. 
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INTRODUCTION: NEW LINES OF MODEL-TO-MODEL ANALYSIS 
In a paper describing an agent-based model of ethnic mobilisation [1] the authors expressed 
the hope that their model was ”a small step towards the creation of a larger number of models 
that would eventually enable better understanding of the recent events in former Yugoslavia”. 
The following considerations are intended as one small step in this direction. In a model-to-model 
analysis their model of ethnic mobilisation will be compared with a model of hierarchy 
decline as a consequence of internal hierarchical operational mechanisms. Comparable 
models of a causal analysis of ethnic mobilisation have been developed by Mimkes [2, 3] or 
Lim et al. [4]. The objective of this approach is comparable to these models. 
Methodologically, the motivation for model-to-model analysis is to overcome a situation of 
researchers working in isolation without anyone else reproducing their results. It would 
enhance the transferability of knowledge drawn from simulation models to overcome this 
situation, i.e. progress should be made possible [5]. Since the research process of simulation 
is closer to experimental science than to deductive logic [6], only a progressive inspection of 
models may enfold their potential bearings. Yet, there are several modes of model-to-model 
analysis suggested by Hales et al. [5]. 
The most straightforward way of undertaking a model-to-model analysis is to replicate a 
model. Related to this approach is the use of models with different structures but the same 
target to confirm their results or to compare different models that announce the same type of 
results and to check their fitness with respect to particular data. What these and related 
techniques have in common, is that the models under investigation are concerned with the 
same or a related target system. 
However, Hales et al. also suggest composing models of different scales in a larger model. 
Moreover, Cioffi-Revilla and Gotts [7] even related two seemingly unrelated models from 
distinct domains to draw out their structural similarities and differences. The comparative 
analysis undertaken here will follow this line of research: to use findings from each domain 
to illuminate the other. However, while the work of Cioffo-Revilla and Gotts is more 
methodologically oriented, the purpose of this approach is more theoretically oriented: to 
utilise the methodology of model-to-model analysis for a conceptual integration of different 
domains of social theory. Namely, to relate models of different aspects of the topic of 
political stability into a common framework [8-10]. Hence, if not to compose models of 
different scales into a larger one, as suggested by Hales et al., then at least it would be 
desirable to identify how they are interrelated. This could enhance the ability to transfer 
knowledge from one model to another. Hence, the models will be used to integrate different 
sociological theories. As a first step in this direction, a framework to compare at least two 
models will be introduced in this article. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Firstly, the historical background will be outlined. The war 
1991-1995 in former Yugoslavia can be regarded as a stylised target of the models. Some 
attempts at an explanation of the war are considered. However, this cannot be done in a 
comprehensive manner. The main purpose of this section is to develop an empirical framework 
to relate the models to different explanatory modes. 
Secondly, the main conceptual ideas and the target system of the models will be introduced. 
However, it has to be taken into account that the models describe stylised facts that can only 
loosely be related to the empirical relative. M. Neumann 
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Finally, a theoretical framework will be outlined into which both models can be integrated. 
Since the models cannot be directly validated against data taken from processes in former 
Yugoslavia (because they describe stylised facts), this framework enables a comparison of 
the models insofar as it provides a common rule. Hence, this theoretical framework can be 
regarded as complementary to the empirical one. This will lead to conclusions relevant for 
the foundations of sociological theory and empirical analysis. 
EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
It is a phenomenon of modern European societies that in the so-called Eastern-European [11] 
or, more specifically, nation-to-state [12] mode of state formation, national movements 
emerge from larger political entities. Examples include the decline of the Austria-Hungarian 
Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire into nation states. This process is still underway: most 
recently a number of Eastern European states have declined along ethnic borderlines. Perhaps 
one of the most severe structural ruptures happened in former Yugoslavia: the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia ended in inter- and intra-state wars between ethnic movements, 
including genocide and ethnic cleaning. Hence, an understanding of the dynamics of the 
decline mechanisms would be crucial for political sociology [13]: ethnic identity seems to be 
a central driving force for the stability and instability of political power. In the following, a 
very brief outline of the recent conflicts in former Yugoslavia will be introduced. 
BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA 
According to the constitution of 1974, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia described itself as 
a multi-national state, consisting of six republics. Each republic comprised one of 
Yugoslavia’s constituent nations. Moreover, the territories of the republics were drawn along 
historically established borderlines. Thus, ethnic movements could rely on cultural traditions. 
Nevertheless, for a long time until the 1980s the degree of ethnic mobilisation was 
considerably low. For example, marriages across different ethnic groups were not an 
exception. Opinion polls of 1990 in Bosnia indicate that more than 90 % of the population 
regarded the ethnic relationships in their local neighbourhood as good [14]. Thus, although 
there was an awareness of it, ethnicity was not an important feature of identity formation. 
After the death of Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980), the long term prime minister of Yugoslavia 
(until his death) and founder of the socialist regime, ethnic movements emerged on the 
territory of Yugoslavia. The escalation of violence took on various forms: punch-ups between 
hooligans as well as rationally calculated speeches by political entrepreneurs [15]. Beginning 
with Slovenia’s declaration to leave the Federal Republic, the process of disintegration finally 
resulted in a series of intra- and inter-state wars [16, 17]. Thus, for the first time after more 
than forty years, the phenomenon of war appeared in Europe. It is well known that the 
collapse of Yugoslavia went alongside massacres and genocide which was a challenge for 
international law [18, 19]. The intensity of the war, however, was highly different within 
various regions: while officially only 19 war victims were counted in Slovenia, the official 
number for Bosnia was 242 330. 
Numerous explanations can be found in the literature, each stressing the importance of 
different explanatory factors: 
1) Perhaps the most prominent and most widely accepted explanation is simply the reference 
to wilful political actions of Slobodan Milosevic (1941-2006), since 1989 head of the 
communist party and president of Serbia, and other members of the political élite. There 
can be no doubt that in the 1980s and early 1990s actors from the centre of the political 
élite consciously escalated the crisis of the Federal Republic to reinforce their personal Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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political power. Thus, a considerable part of the political élite gained personal advantage 
from the political collapse of the Federal Republic [20]. However, the questions remain, 
firstly, why the more aggressive politicians were more successful than the political ‘doves’ 
and, secondly, why they were successful at this particular time and not at other times [1]. 
This question can be traced back to two factors: 
2) One factor can be identified in the international situation [21]: at the end of the Cold War, 
international relations were in a phase of destabilisation. The ‘new world order’ still had to 
be found. For example, some authors stress that the early acceptance of Slovenia and 
Croatia by the European Union, particularly enforced by Germany, yet, without possessing 
regulatory power when the war escalated, was in part responsible for the escalation. The 
unclear and too weak mandate of UN soldiers is another example. Yet these factors can 
explain the possibility of the escalation but not why it took place in the first place. 
3) One therefore has to enquire about the internal conditions of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Classical political economy would call for an investigation of the economic 
situation. In fact, Yugoslavia underwent a serious economic crisis in the 1980s [22]. From 
the mid 1980s, Yugoslavia was confronted with a decreasing production volume. Also, the 
republic had to face a dramatic increase in the inflation rate. In 1989, there was even a 
hyperinflation of 2700 %. Together with wages remaining at a constant level, this led to a 
dramatic decrease in the standard of living. Moreover, the combination of these factors 
resulted in a dramatic increase in state debts. Thus, political collapse went hand in hand 
with economic collapse. 
4) Nevertheless, the economic situation itself cannot explain why nationalist political leaders 
took advantage of this particular situation. A prominent explanation for this phenomenon 
is the recourse to history. Particularly, history was stressed by the ideologies of the 
nationalist leaders [23-26]. Wars in the very early history of the region, such as the battle 
of Kosovo Polje [27] served as a demonstration of the impossibility of Yugoslavia as a 
nation state. Even though these ‘explanations’ are clearly ideological, the question has to 
be answered why these ideologies were successful. In fact, one can argue that the founders 
of Yugoslavia had to rely on pre-existing nations with a rather long history for the 
constitution of the Federal Republic. Thus, societal conditions determining cultural modes 
of identity formation have to be taken into account for the understanding of the borderlines 
of the conflicts [28]. In particular, conflicts may crystallise at the borderlines of the 
different religions [29] and different languages [30] within the one Federal Republic. 
BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE MODELS 
Without a doubt, all these factors contribute to an explanation of the phenomenon. Hence, a 
conceptual integration of these different aspects would be desirable. To contribute to an 
understanding of the mechanisms of the interaction of the explanatory factors, in this paper a 
comparison of two models concerned with two of these topics shall be undertaken. Both 
models highlight very different aspects of social disintegration. As the title of their paper, ‘An 
Agent-Based Model of Ethnic Mobilisation‘ [1] indicates, the model developed by 
Srbljinovic et al. is concerned with the process of ethnic mobilisation. The MUE & HIER 
model [31], however, deals with the macrosocial decline of hierarchy levels. M. Neumann 
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AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF ETHNIC MOBILISATION 
The Model 
The target of this model is described by its title: to study ethnic mobilisation. This is inspired 
by already existing theories of mobilisation [32, 33] and methodically implemented by 
extending modelling constructs which have already been in use so far [34, 35]. Developed in 
co-operation with the Croatian MoD’s Institute for Defence Studies, Research and 
Development, the background of the model is factual ethnic mobilisation in the course of the 
war 1991-1995 in former Yugoslavia. However, in the model this can only be described as 
stylised facts. Hence, the model is not an instrument for prognostic purposes but intends to 
investigate possible social mechanisms that can generate patterns such as ethnic mobilisation. 
The question analysed by the model is how successful political entrepreneurs are in 
mobilising ethnical identities and in identifying the conditions for the escalation of ethnic 
conflicts. In particular, the model was inspired by the observation that in former Yugoslavia 
regions with very little differences in their socio-economic characteristics exhibited great 
differences in their degree of ethnic mobilisation. The question therefore remains as to what 
factors are responsible for the success of mobilising activities by political actors. 
The model is an agent-based model written in SWARM. It consists of 200 agents with a fixed 
ethnic identity: They can be blue or red, which cannot be changed. The dependent variable in 
the model is the degree of ethnic mobilisation, m
i, of each actor i. The degree to which they 
identify themselves with their given ethnicity can vary between 0 and 1. The difference 
between the maximum of 1 and the actual value is interpreted as the importance that an agent 
attaches to this ethnic identity in comparison to other possible identities. The actual degree of 
ethnic mobilisation is dependent on several social conditions: 
•  Firstly, it depends on the satisfaction of the agents with their life conditions, expressed by 
a grievance degree gr
i. It is a variable which can also vary between 0 and 1. This captures 
the satisfaction with economic, political and other aspects of social life. 
•  Secondly, it depends on the agents’ social network: the agents are able to observe the 
identity and the agents’ degree of mobilisation in their social network, which influences 
their degree of mobilisation m
i. This is formalised as: 
  m
i
socnet = k⋅(impsame + impother) / netsize (1) 
The term m
i
socnet denotes the influence of the social network on the mobilisation of agent i. 
k is simply a coefficient, to control the magnitude of this influence. The number of agents 
in the social network of agent i is denoted by netsize, and impsame and impother denote the 
impact of members of the network whit the same and the other colour on the mobilisation 
of agent i. 
•  In particular, during the simulation the agents receive appeals, which may be red, blue or 
grey, i.e. neutral. However, in the absence of appeals the degree of mobilisation gradually 
decreases to 0 and the strength of the susceptibility of agents to ethnic appeals is smoothed 
by the grievance coefficient: 
  k⋅ksame⋅gr
i⋅m
i(t), for appeals of same colour,   
  m
i
app = k⋅kother⋅gr
i⋅m
i(t), for appeals of other colour,  (2) 
  k⋅kneutral⋅gr
i⋅[1 – m
i(t)], for neutral appeals.   
The quantity m
i
app is the impact of appeals on the degree of mobilisation of agent i, k is a 
constant to control the magnitude of this influence. The same holds for ksame, kother and kneutral: 
they are constants to control the strength of the respective appeals. This is multiplied with the Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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satisfaction with life conditions and the already existing degree of mobilisation of agent i. 
Thus, the effect of appeals is stronger, if the agent has already a high degree of mobilisation 
and the more dissatisfied the agents are. The inverse relation holds for neutral appeals. 
The appeals are public in the sense that they are observable for every agent. Hence, the agents 
can react to stimuli of their own colour as well as to stimuli of other colours. Their initial 
degree of identification is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 and they have a constant value 
of satisfaction with their life condition of 0,5. Finally, their network size is chosen randomly. 
This structure can be summarised as follows: with m
i
app and m
i
socnet as defined above, and 
m
i
cool as the cooling effect, the dynamics of ethnic mobilisation reads as: 
  m
i(t + 1) = m
i(t) + (m
i
app+ m
i
socnet + m
i
cool)⋅∆t (3) 
which can be graphically displayed as in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1. Structure of agent mobilisation. 
Simulation results 
This model was used to undertake a series of experiments to investigate the behaviour of the 
dependent variable − the degree of ethnic mobilisation − in cases of varying constellations of 
the independent variables. 100 agents are red and 100 agents are blue. Initially, they receive 
only appeals of the colours red and grey. These appeals are given at constant intervals. In an 
initial experiment it was checked whether the model behaviour was as expected: for example, 
an increase in coloured appeals increases the speed of mobilisation. Moreover, simulation 
runs resulted in a degree of ethnic mobilisation of either 1 or 0, dependent on whether the 
mobilising or cooling effect was stronger. This seemed to be a plausible result. Furthermore, 
mobilisation was faster when the agents possessed a social network. 
The objective of this simulation runs was to enhance trust in the model. However, even in the 
initial setting it could be observed that in some simulation runs the average mobilisation 
intensity remained approximately constant for quite long simulation periods. This was mainly 
dependent on the appeal frequency. This was the focus of interest for further experiments. 
Hence, in the next step a closer examination of this more complex behaviour was undertaken. 
Therefore the simulation runs were repeated with a randomly chosen appeal frequency. 
Approximately 60 % of the simulation runs showed the following result: either both 
populations reached a degree of mobilisation of 0 or the reds converged to 1 and the blues to 0. 
However, a long period of oscillation could be observed. Some simulation runs even 
remained in the oscillatory mode. 
The next experimental setting was to investigate the influence of the agent’s network 
composition. Hence, the experiments were repeated with a varying probability of having a 
friend of the same colour. In the case of  relatively homogeneous networks, the result was 
that only the outcome documented above appeared: either both populations reach degrees of M. Neumann 
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mobilisation of 0, or the reds converges to 1 and the blues to 0. However, an increase in the 
network’s diversity also increased the diversity of the outcomes. 
A further experiment was to vary the degree of satisfaction with the life conditions. Instead of 
a constant degree of satisfaction of 0,5, a uniform distribution with the mean value 0,5 was 
chosen. Moreover, the variance of the distribution was varied. While some new patterns 
arose, diversity of the results diminished with increasing variance of the satisfaction. The 
most frequent outcome was a mobilising intensity value of 0,9 for red and 0,5 for blue. 
Finally, experiments were undertaken with appeals of both red and blue colour. A red appeal 
was given every 3
rd simulation period, and a neutral one was given every 4
th period. Then 
blue appeals were introduced with varying frequency. With the other parameters as in the 
initial setting, surprisingly, blue appeals seem to strengthen the mobilisation of the red agents. 
Empirical evidence 
The main result of these simulation experiments was that differences  in the degree of 
mobilisation appeared across similar populations. This result captures the observation that 
differences in the degree of ethnic mobilisation cannot be tracked back to socio-economic 
factors. Srbljinovic et al. [1] mention ethnic conflicts in the Croatian region of Lika with a 
mixed Croatian and Serbian population, while other areas with very similar socio-demographic 
characteristics remained stable. This finding can be explained by the model. According to the 
model, this is merely due to random effects in the initialisation of the primary ethnic 
mobilisation as well as their network composition. Yet this limits the predictability of the 
simulation runs. The conclusion drawn from this result is that processes such as ethnic 
mobilisation, once they are initialised, are only controllable to a very limited degree. 
A MODEL OF HIERARCHY DECLINE 
On the other hand, the model of hierarchy decline is an equation-based model to evaluate the 
range of a theory of social power. While the agent-based model of ethnic mobilisation is 
explicitly motivated by the escalation of ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the MUE & 
HIER model was not intentionally developed to model a (however stylised) concrete target 
system. The objective of the model was to formalise a general theory of hierarchical 
operational mechanisms. Therefore, the relationship of this model to processes in former 
Yugoslavia has to be denoted explicitly. 
The main theoretical term of this theory is the notion of a power territory (PT), governed by a 
so-called power territory ruler (PTR). The theory aims at formulating idealised structural conditions 
for the behaviour of PTs, namely three existence conditions and one operation condition [36]: 
•  Existence condition 1 (competence) 
At least one competence field has to be defined for each PT. 
•  Existence condition 2 (scope and effect) 
Let individuals or social units in the competence field of a PT be called clients of the PT; 
then the relation between the number of clients and the number of PT members may not 
fall below a certain minimum. It is obvious that this minimum number is greater than or 
equal to 1, i.e. that there has to be at least one client allocated to each PT member .  
•  Existence condition 3 (budget) 
The PT has to dispose of sufficient financial assets. 
•  Operation condition 
If a PT exists, one central condition for its undisturbed operation is that PT strategies are effective. Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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This theory can be graphically displayed, Fig. 2. The square indicates the society (large social 
unit). The PTs are indicated by the cones which serve clients in their competence field. 
 
Figure 2. Structure of PT System - the wiggly lines represent the competence fields. 
The Model 
The MUE & HIER model described in [31] is an equation-based model written in 
DYNAMO. It relies on the theoretical framework as outlined above. The central variable is 
the number of positions in a so-called Power Territory (PT) system. The focus of the model is 
how hierarchical operational mechanisms are shaped by person-position relations. Hence, it is 
a model of élite exchange. Three types of élite exchange are implemented in the model: 
•  A continuous flux of ordinary replacement, for example, after retirement. 
•  Medium size structural ruptures, for example governmental change after elections. 
•  Serious structural ruptures like civil wars or the collapse of hierarchy levels. 
The model consists of 8 sectors at all. However, they will not be outlined completely in this 
paper; to concentrate on the purpose of comparison, only the central operational mechanisms 
will be highlighted in more detail: the positions in the PT system, the personnel in the PT system, 
the hierarchical operational mechanisms, and the ruling demand and budget of the PT system. 
Ad 1) The Positions in the PT System. The positions in the PT system are calculated 
according to the hypothesis of a strict hierarchy, i.e. it is assumed that there is a constant 
relation between the number of positions along the hierarchy levels. For example the relation 
between the positions on the top level and the underlying one is 1 : 10. Hence, the positional 
dynamics is predominantly driven by the top level in the hierarchy, articulating the demand 
for positions of sub-PTRs. It is possible, however, that one person can hold multiple 
positions. The growth of oligarchic positions is driven by three mechanisms: 
•  Ordinary growth 
•  PT partition 
•  Downward mobility; i.e. the creation of new positions on lower hierarchy levels. 
The decline of oligarchic positions on level i is calculated by a specific alarm function, 
dependent on overdebt in i, and a so-called career aspirants crowding alarm (explained in the M. Neumann 
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paragraph on hierarchical operational mechanisms). However, it is smoothed by a passing 
over of financial restrictions in i to lower hierarchy levels. The most important growth 
mechanism is PT partition: if ordinary growth of PT positions is low compared with the 
number of additional positions desired by career aspirants, then the PT partition quota grows. 
Ad 2) The personnel in the PT system. The personnel dynamics is predominantly driven by 
career aspirants on lower hierarchy levels, waiting for higher positions in the hierarchy. 
However, since the model is an equation based model, the career aspirants are not modelled 
individually. It is simply a quota from the number of persons inhabiting positions at hierarchy 
level i –1, which are assumed to have the desire to gain positions on higher levels. 
In particular, this section contains a waiting chain for career aspirants, which determines the 
above mentioned crowding alarm. At the beginning of every time step the waiting chain is 
occupied with career aspirants on the one hand and persons that formerly have lost their PT 
positions in structural ruptures on the other. This is realised as a flow model in the system 
dynamics style. After this process PT positions are created and occupied with persons from 
the waiting chain. 
Ad 3) Hierarchical operational mechanisms. This section defines the crowding alarm. When 
the waiting chain is filled, the crowding alarm is activated. It will be shown below (in the 
section: the dynamics of the model) that this function is of central importance for the model 
behaviour. It is important to note that career aspirants have to follow the hierarchy: hence, 
first they gain positions on the lowest hierarchy level. If they have achieved a position on this 
level they can wait for a position on the next higher level, and so on. Again note, that their 
career is not modelled individually, but only as a quota of the persons occupying a position at 
each hierarchy level. 
At this point the interaction between the positional and the personnel dynamics come into 
play: Positions are created by the top level. However, because a growth of top positions in the 
PT system leads to an even greater increase in the number of positions on the lower hierarchy 
levels this leads to a greater number of persons inhabiting positions which qualify them for 
positions on a higher hierarchy level – i.e. this leads to an increase of career aspirants. Note, 
that the quota remains constant. Thus, a greater number of positions leads to a greater number 
of career aspirants. 
In particular through the mechanism of PT partition, this mechanism leads to a growth of the 
PT system. Hence, an autocatalytic dynamic is the consequence: growth of the PT system 
yields growth of the waiting chain, which yields growth of the PT system. The unsatisfied 
career aspirants, however, are the driving force for the crowding alarm function, since they 
are assumed as enhancing the revolutionary potential: they have the know-how of how PTs 
are running as well as the ambition to rule a PT. 
Ad 4) Ruling demand and budget of the PT system. The budget of the PT is particularly 
dependent on the ruling demand, however limited by a ceiling, when a threshold of maximum 
overdebt is reached. 
The ruling demand of a PT is specified by the number of involvement in activities. These are 
specified by the number of contacts within the PT system. The demand per activity is 
calculated by a linear combination of a minimum and a maximum demand per interaction. 
While the minimum demand is simply a constant, the maximum demand is to denote conflict 
interactions. It is assumed that a certain quota of interactions is of such a kind and that 
conflict interactions are more costly. If conflicts become more numerous, the so-called hectic 
state intensity is increasing. It is assumed that in turn conflict interactions are even more 
frequently when this stress is increasing, what recursively intensifies the hectic state. it Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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follows that an increasing amount of money and personnel is needed to deal with these 
conflicts. Thus, again there is an autocatalytic process: increasing number of PT positions 
yield an increasing hectic state which yields to an increasing demand of PT positions. 
Summary. Hence, in principle the model is a waiting chain model: In the centre of the model 
is a waiting chain of career aspirants, which is mostly responsible for the dynamics of the 
model. However, each sector of the model consists of many interdependent equations, which 
does not permit to display them in a fashion sufficient for replication within this article 
(comp. [28, pp. 274-307]). Therefore a simplified graphical illustration might help to identify 
its main causal structure, Fig. 3. 
Figure 3. Causal structure of the model. 
Hierarchical positions at the hierarchy level i are generated at the above level i + 1. The process 
of generating positions is amplified by conflicts on the hierarchy level i + 1. The positions at 
level i are occupied with persons from the waiting chain. Thereby the number of  persons in 
the waiting chain is reduced. The waiting chain is filled with career aspirants from the lower 
hierarchy level i – 1. If the maximum capacity of the waiting chain is reached, the overcrowding 
of the waiting chain activates an alarm function. This alarm function enhances the value of a 
structural rupture register function. A further input for this register function comes from financial 
restrictions. The financial demand is caused by the positions at level i: the more positions 
exist the greater is the financial demand. If a certain threshold of the structural rupture register 
function is reached, the function is activated which destroys the top hierarchy level i + 1. 
Simulation results 
The dynamics of the model is mainly driven by the two autocatalytic processes which result 
in a strongly growing PT system: These are processes implemented in the sector of the 
personnel of PTs and in the hierarchical operational mechanisms: 
•  PT growth → waiting chain growth → PT growth 
•  PT growth → increase conflict interactions → PT growth 
The growth of the PT system leads to a strongly growing financial demand. This can be 
financed by two means: through growth of GNP and through debt. Since in the long run the 
growth of GNP has to be extreme high to fulfil the demand of the PT system, after a while the M. Neumann 
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PT system turns into a mode of debt financed growth. Then the structural rupture register 
function is activated. After a structural rupture the register function relaxes to zero. 
As a result of the decline, however, the positions on the top level are destroyed and, 
consequently, the persons inhabiting these positions are thrown into the waiting chain and 
again the process starts from the beginning. 
Empirical evidence 
Obviously, the decline of former Yugoslavia can be described as a decline of a hierarchy 
level. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed into its pre-existing constituting parts. 
This process was enforced by political leaders with a high revolutionary potential: for example, 
during Tito’s regime, Franjo Tudjman (1922-1999), from 1992 until his death the first 
president of Croatia, had already been in prison in the 1970s and the 1980s due to so-called 
nationalist agitation [12]. However, the qualitative analogies go even further: the constitution 
of 1974 can be regarded as a PT partition, as described by the model. This constitution 
describes the republics as states and even gives regions like Kosovo and Vojvodina more 
autonomy  [37]. Therefore political aspirants can be satisfied with PT positions in these 
regions. Also two phases of PT growth can be distinguished in former Yugoslavia: The 
successful 1960s which was a phase financed by GNP growth can be distinguished from the 
time of the 1980s which was characterised by growing debts. Thus, even though the model 
was not intentionally developed to cover the events in former Yugoslavia, the theoretical 
assumptions underlying the model are in fact confirmed by them. 
OUTLINE OF A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Both aspects of ethnic mobilisation and hierarchy decline can be observed in the history of former 
Yugoslavia: On the one hand, there was a decline of the Federal Republic into smaller units 
along pre-existing borderlines of a lower hierarchy level. On the other hand, one of the central 
driving forces behind this process was the mobilisation of ethnic identities. Hence, empirical 
evidence suggests, that these models capture some relevant aspects of the processes which 
had to be observed in the former Yugoslavia. But how are these aspects related to one another? 
In the model of ethnic mobilisation the ethnic appeals are given as external facts. No analysis 
is made regarding where these appeals come from. Hence, obviously the question cannot be 
posed why they are given at all. On the other hand, the model of hierarchy decline is blind to 
the borderlines of the decline. This is due to the fact that the competence fields are not 
specified in the model. Thus, no conditions of success or failure can be identified. Hence, it 
appears to be reasonable to regard both models as complementary in ‘some way’. 
However, both models are concerned with stylised facts; they do not represent a concrete 
target system [38]. Firstly, this is due to the overwhelming complexity of social reality, which 
cannot be represented by a simulation model. In contrast to models based on first principles 
(at least rhetorically) the actual state of the social sciences does not allow for reliance on 
some simple laws representing the complexity of their target system [38, 39]. Hence, it has to 
be questioned in what respect, i.e. in what ‘way’ they can be compared: Since the empirical 
facts cannot serve as a rule to compare models of stylised facts, there is no measure available 
to judge the validity of these models in a straightforward manner. Yet, the notion of stylised 
facts implies what can be called a proto-theory: in principle, a stylised fact is a shorthand for 
a theory taken from everyday knowledge. Thus, it is plausible to identify the theoretical 
framework behind the stylised facts. A theoretical structure will therefore be developed 
which is able to relate both models in a common theoretical framework. Within such a 
framework it is possible to identify which questions are posed and answered by the models Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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and which are left open by them. Hence, such a theoretical framework is a precondition to 
relate isolated models of stylised facts to one another insofar as this theoretical framework 
can serve as a rule: instead of comparing the models directly, firstly the theoretical topic with 
which the models are concerned will be identified and then these theoretical topics can be 
compared to relate the modelled stylised facts to one another. It thus becomes possible to 
identify the extend to which the models’ behaviour factually intersects. 
DECISION CENTRES AND MASS PHENOMENA 
In fact, the targets of the models can be distinguished by the way they are generated as well 
as by their functional relevance within social processes. 
In a first step, a more formally oriented differentiation will be introduced of how some output 
data Y is generated to reflect the difference between the models [40]: it may result from a 
sequence of processes which, in principle, can be divided into two categories. It may result as 
a consequence of a process in a social decision centre or it may result as an aggregate of a 
sum of individual processes, thus, it may be a social mass phenomenon. Decision centres are 
social units whose reactions constitute instances of concentrated influences [41]. The 
concentration can be identified by the relationship between the number of specific reactions 
and the number of actors producing these reactions. Examples may be war between nation 
states or the building of motorways [40]. For instance, if the president of the United States 
declares war, this is a decision of an individual person. Yet it can affect – in principle – the 
whole human race. If no such influence concentration can be observed, the socially generated 
data has to be regarded as mass phenomena. Examples of mass phenomena are income 
distributions, language or a traffic jam. Every statistical aggregate is a mass phenomenon. 
Hence, in principle, socially generated data Y is the set union of the set of mass phenomena 
and phenomena caused by decision centers: 
  Y = {YDC} ∪ {YMASS} (4) 
With regard to the models, this distinction leads to the following formal classification of the 
models: 
•  In the model of ethnic mobilisation no influence concentration is implemented. Of course, 
the agents are highly determined by the ethnic appeals they receive. However, these 
appeals are not ascribed to an individual actor. Thus, the model describes a mass 
phenomenon, since ethnic mobilisation is a social phenomena only insofar as it appears as 
a mass phenomenon. 
•  On the contrary, the existence or the decline, respectively, of hierarchies is not a mass 
phenomenon. Hierarchies can be regarded as mechanisms for collective decisions, i.e. as a 
decision centre. Hence, the model of hierarchy decline is concerned with operational 
mechanisms of decision centres. 
Thus, as a first result, the models can be identified as models of mass phenomena and 
decision centres, respectively. This distinction leads to a first more formally oriented 
conclusion of how the processes described by the models can be differentiated. 
However, the next sociological question is under what circumstances mass phenomena and 
processes within decision centres are related to one another. Obviously, many operations of 
decision centres do not cause mass mobilisation. On the other hand, not every mass phenomenon 
concerns competence fields of PTs and will in turn enhance the probability of conflict 
interactions. For instance, the mass phenomenon of smoking has caused operations within 
decision centres only in the last decade. Hence, the question remains: when do both levels 
affect each other? This leads to the question of what are the material social conditions at work M. Neumann 
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behind these two phenomena. What is the causal mechanism to connect decision centres and 
mass phenomena? Hence, the question of their functional relevance has to be addressed. 
INSTITUTIONS AND POSITIONS 
On the one hand, the mass phenomenon of ethnic identity is a predisposition for social 
orientation, directing social action. This refers to the notion of the homo sociologicus [42]. 
Hence, ethnic mobilisation can be regarded as an example of the enforcement of a social 
institution [43, 44]. Although a detailed examination of the sociology of institutions cannot 
be undertaken [45, 46], some key elements can be highlighted: these are elements of sociality 
within the individuals, which can be regarded as the non-contractual elements in the social 
contract [47]. They can be regarded as an element of sociality in the brains of the individuals. 
It is claimed that institutions are necessary to regulate social interaction in a way that people 
are able to interpret and enable them to react to other actors’ behaviour. Hence, institutions 
create stable behaviour patterns. Ethnicity provides a means for the formation of such forms 
of stable behaviour patterns. People can create a personal identity by relying on their ethnicity: 
ethnicity provides a social role for individuals [48]. Moreover, it enables people to structure 
their world view insofar as it provides a means for the inclusion and exclusion of other people 
in a commonly shared way. Hence, ethnicity is an institution to regulate social interaction. 
Now, let us ask what kind of phenomena decision centres are: hierarchically organised 
decision centres can be regarded as formal organisations. Yet, a comprehensive review of the 
sociology of organisations cannot be the task of this article (compare e.g. [49, 50]). However, 
a central feature of formal organisations is that the legitimisation of social relations is 
organised by a membership relation [51]. Following Peter Blau [52], it will be proposed to 
conceptualise the difference between membership and non-membership in a decision centre 
as the distribution of a population among social positions. This is because social structure 
”nearly always includes the concepts that there are differences in social positions, and that 
there are social relations among these positions” [52, p. 27]. Undoubtedly, social positions 
influence people’s social relations, but they have to be distinguished from mere interaction. 
At different times the same position can be inhabited by different people. By the 
establishment of social positions, society faces the individuals. Inhabiting positions in formal 
organisations enables individuals to distinguish between official duties and private life [51]. 
Note, that the creation of position and the struggle of individuals to gain positions are the 
core process of the model of hierarchy decline. Thus, it is a model of the dynamics inherent 
in organisational positions. To sum up: 
a) Hierarchies, on the one hand, are operational mechanisms of decision centres, constituted 
by social positions. 
b) Ethnicity, on the other hand, as a mass phenomenon is a social institution, directing 
individual actions as their precondition. 
Yet the question remains, as to how they are related: empirically, the phenomena of hierarchy 
decline went alongside ethnic mobilisation. However, the extend to which the behaviour of 
the models intersects must be theoretically deduced. It will therefore be theoretically 
demonstrated that, in fact, institutions and organisations have a causal power on each other. 
THE THEORETICAL LINK 
Thus, the stylised target systems of the two models can be distinguished by the way they are 
generated as well as by their functional relevance. However, the question remains of how 
they are linked together: when do mass phenomena and decision centres affect each other. 
Such a link would enable to integrate sociological theories of institutions and organisations. Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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1) The input of the model of hierarchy decline for the model of ethnic mobilisation 
On the one hand, it is a plausible assumption, that the appeals that the agents receive in the 
model of ethnic mobilisation are caused by decision centres. Obviously, this was the case in 
former Yugoslavia. Their analysis is left open in the model of ethnic mobilisation. Note, 
however, that the degree of mobilisation drops to zero in the absence of ethnic appeals. 
Therefore appeals and, in turn, the existence of decision centres is of central relevance for the 
reinforcement of the social institution of ethnic identity. The absence of ethnic appeals can 
explain the long period of peace in former Yugoslavia. The MUE & HIER model provides an 
explanation for their appearance. The frequency of ethnic appeals can be explained by the 
length of the waiting chain of career aspirants. The frequency of appeals should increase with 
the length of the waiting chain, because career aspirants (the persons in the waiting chain) might 
gain advantages if they can be identified as a representative of a social institution like ethnic 
identity. This might help explain the rise of the number of political entrepreneurs in the specific 
situation of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Namely, the precarious economic 
situation of the 1980s did not allow for the creation of a sufficient number of positions to 
satisfy career aspirants, i.e. an overcrowding of the waiting chain has to be expected. 
2) The input of the model of ethnic mobilisation for the model of hierarchy decline 
On the other hand, according to the model of hierarchy decline, a precondition for the 
operation of decision centres is the existence of a competence field. The specification of 
competence fields, however, is left open by the model. This is what the model of ethnic 
mobilisation is about. To be regarded as competent, a decision centre has to possess defining 
power over a specific topic. However, the topic cannot be arbitrary. For instance, people 
would not ascribe any competence to a political leader appealing to condemn, e.g. red-haired 
people (at least nowadays). The propensity, to be regarded as important, increases if a 
competence field refers to a social institution. Ethnicity provides such an institution. Thus, 
the notion of a competence field links decision centres to mass phenomena of social 
institutions like ethnicity. This might help explain the concrete nature of the appeals of the 
political entrepreneurs. Insofar as they have to find a competence field, it might be an 
advantage for them to appeal to institutionally deep-seated patterns of social orientation like 
ethnic identity. The degree of mobilisation can be regarded as a measure of their success. 
Note, for instance, that the parents of Slobodan Milosevic were Montenegrins and that his 
brother Bora made a political career as a Montenegrin. 
In conclusion, the relation between institutions and organisations can be described by the 
analogy of a lock and key: a social institution like ethnic identity provides a possible 
competence field for decision centres. Since the existence of a competence field is a 
necessary precondition for the operation of decision centres, institutions may be regarded as a 
lock for the success of a decision centre; namely insofar as appeals from decision centres 
have to match a social institution like a key has to match a lock. The metaphor of a lock is 
used to denote that institutions play a ‘passive role’: obviously, they are not a social actor. 
Conversely, decision centres possess the power to reinforce a social institution like ethnicity 
(for instance, by sending ethnic appeals). In  fact, this is reflected in the model of ethnic 
mobilisation by the assumption that ethnic mobilisation drops to zero in the absence of ethnic 
appeals. Thus, decision centres are the key to call into being the social institution of ethnic 
identity, and, in turn, processes of ethnic mobilisation. The metaphor of a key is used to 
denote that organisations are a social actor, they play the ‘active role’. 
Hence, this theoretical framework allows us to show where the behaviour of the models 
intersects: Namely, the appeals in the model of ethnic mobilisation may be generated by the M. Neumann 
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model of the decision centres while the competence fields in the model of hierarchy decline 
may be defined by the model of the mass-phenomenon of mobilisation. The success in 
establishing a competence field can be measured by the degree of mobilisation. The formal 
structure of a model docking can be described as in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Causal interaction of the models. 
Decision centres have to be regarded as possessing a competence field. This is a precondition 
for their succesfull operation: it is the legitimisation for the positions in the PT. To be 
regarded as competent, they can send appeals. These may be successful if they address social 
institutions. Note, that a competence field may not necessarily be ethnicity. The frequency of 
ethnic appeals may be determined by the length of the waiting chain. In particular, waiting 
chain overcrowding might increase the number of appeals. Thus, career aspriants are the 
main driving force. This in turn leads to a reinforcement of an institution. Yet, the 
competition between decision centres to be regarded as representing an institution may cause 
conflict interactions between the decision centres. Note, that the degree of conflict 
interactions already serves as an input for the structural rupture register function, which 
determines the stability of the organisational system. However, in the model it not specified 
what the conflicts are about. This can be specified by a model of the mass-phenomenon of 
mobilisation. Thus, the degree of ethnic mobilisation may be used as an input for the 
calculation of conflict interactions. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
Finally, this investigation shall be brought to an end with some remarks on the 
epistemological perspective opened up by these considerations: Theoretically, the model-to-
model analysis opens a perspective on theories of the relation between culture and politics 
and the related question of social constructivism: following Cederman [53], 3 theories of the 
relationship between culture and politics can be distinguished. An essentialist, an 
instrumental-constructivist, and a limited-constructivist approach. The essentialist approach 
stresses the role of the cultural ‘raw material’. Hence, ethnicity is assumed as given and ”each 
ethnic core produces a political identity more or less straightforwardly” [53]. The 
constructivist approaches, on the contrary, emphasize the active role of politics in the 
formation of ethnic identities by manipulating cultural symbols. According to the 
instrumentalist-constructivism the causal chain goes from politics to culture, which is seen 
more or less as an epiphenomenon. The limited-constructivist approach, however, sees the 
relation between culture and politics as a complex feedback structure: political actors do 
shape the cultural material, but they are limited in their freedom of choice. 
The two models under consideration implement a mechanism [54, 55] of such a feedback loop: 
On the one hand ethnicity is a pre-given fact in the model of ethnic mobilisation. Thus, this Complexity of social stability: a model-to-model analysis of Yugoslavia’s decline 
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assumption is in contrast to an instrumentalist-constructivist approach. Nevertheless, the degree 
of mobilisation is open for political manipulation by the means of ethnic appeals. These appeals 
can be analysed by the means of the model of hierarchical operational mechanisms: PTs are 
successful if they can find a competence field. This means that they have to send some forms of 
appeals to prove their competence. This is a constructivist perspective since they have the 
ability to manipulate cultural symbols. However, they can be more or less successful. In particular, 
their chance to be successful enhances if they can point to social institutions. These institutions 
can be regarded as the cultural ‘raw material’, which limit the freedom of manipulating cultural 
symbols. Thus, the integration of the two models, i.e. the methodological approach of a model-
to-model analysis, turns out to be relevant for the epistemological foundations of social theory: 
namely, it suggests a limited-constructivism by demonstrating possible mechanisms of a 
feedback loop between voluntary political action and cultural conditions. 
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVE 
The considerations developed in this paper can only be regarded as a brief outline and are by 
no means a comprehensive investigation of either the empirical or the theoretical background 
of a political sociology. Moreover, no direct political advice could be expected from this 
more fundamental research. However, it enables a methodological and a theoretical 
clarification as well as it helps for a conceptual integration of the different explanations of the 
inter- and intra state wars in former Yugoslavia: 
1)  Firstly, due to the fact that Artificial Societies describe stylised facts, this model-to-model 
analysis is only possible by explicitly enfolding the theoretical dimensions behind the 
everyday theories of stylised facts. Theoretical considerations provide a tool for relating 
models concerned with seemingly diverse phenomena. Thus, at this point the theoretical 
considerations developed in this paper serve as an input for methodology.  
2)  On the other hand, also social theory profits from this methodological research. Insofar as 
simulation models allow for a formal docking of models, they should also allow for a 
theoretical discourse: commonly, theories concerned with cultural phenomena on the one 
hand and political theories on the other hand, or more general theories of social micro- or 
macro phenomena, respectively, employ a highly different language. It is therefore no 
trivial task to undertake a comparative theory analysis. However, by using simulation 
models, a common language can be elaborated within which it seems possible that the 
theories from both levels could benefit from findings on the other level. In principle, it 
should be possible that both models could import and export data to a common software 
frame: On the one hand, the model of hierarchy decline could export data about the length 
of the waiting chain. This data could be utilised to calculate the appeal frequency that 
could be imported by the model of ethnic mobilisation. Note that appeals are given 
externally in this model anyway. On the other hand, the model of ethnic mobilisation 
could export data about the average degree of mobilisation. This data could be imported 
by the model of hierarchy decline to calculate the degree of conflict interactions. Note that 
these are given as a simple quota and are not calculated internally in the original model. 
Along these lines, the model-to-model analysis could allow for the conceptual integration 
of social theory. In particular, a sensitivity analysis might allow for an investigation of the 
recursive impact of the two levels of social theory (which are at the backdrop of the 
stylised facts of the models) on each other. 
3)  Moreover, it has been pointed out, that the different explanations of the empirical 
phenomenon of the series of intra- and inter-state wars all contribute to an understanding 
of different aspects of the phenomenon. The model-to-model analysis allows for a 
conceptual integration of those explanations highlighting internal conditions: The first M. Neumann 
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explanation outlined in the section about the empirical background was that the decline of 
Yugoslavia was driven by wilful political action. This can be explained by the model of 
hierarchy decline: namely, an overcrowding of the waiting chain with career aspirants 
suggests a high probability of aggressive political action. However, the possibility of PTs 
to generate positions, which could prevent such an overcrowding is dependent on financial 
restrictions. This refers to the third explanation: precarious economic circumstances. Thus, 
the model of hierarchy decline might help to integrate these two explanations: why 
aggressive political actors emerge at a given time. By the model of ethnic mobilisation the 
cultural borderlines of the conflict can be taken into account. This was the forth 
explanatory mode. This model explains why aggressive political actors where successful 
with propagating a nationalist ideology. Hence, except for the international situation the 
two models provide a framework to integrate the internal conditions that where proposed 
to explain Yugoslavia’s disaster. 
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KOMPLEKSNOST SOCIJALNE STABILNOSTI: ANALIZA 
RASPADA JUGOSLAVIJE POMOĆU MODELĀ 
M. Neumann
 Sveučlilište u Bayreuthu 
 Bayreuth, Njemačka 
SAŽETAK 
U radu je opisana analiza modelā u kojoj se uspoređuju model etničke mobilizacije s modelom raspada 
hijerarhije. Ti modeli nisu postavljena za jednaku, ili sličnu svrhu, ali su empirijski povezani: raspad federativne 
republike Jugoslavije većinom je uzrokovan etničkom moblizacijom. Ovo je općenitija situacija i nije vezana 
samo uz ovaj posebni slučaj. Zbog toga oba modela mogu biti razmatrana kao povezani aspekti jednog 
društvenog procesa. Međutim, budući da ni jedan model ne opisuje konkretni nego stilizirani sustav, ne možemo 
ih izravno uspoređivati s podacima. Umjesto toga, u ovom je radu postavljen teorijski okvir: na temelju 
razlikovanja masovnih pojava i središta odlučivanja, etničku mobilizaciju može se promatrati kao masovnu 
pojavu, dok je raspad hijerarhije vezan uz društvena središta odlučivanja. Dok masovne pojave postaju 
djelotvorne uključivanjem institucija, radni uvjeti za središta odlučivanja je uspostava društvenih pozicija. 
Relacija navedenih pojava slikovito je opisana na način koji omogućava zaključivanje vezano uz društvene 
pojave i emprijska objašnjenja. 
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